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It is widely reported in the literature that it is not possible to test nonmarket
good preference restrictions against revealed preference. While it is clearly impossible
to aﬃrm any particular preference restriction as being “true,” it is possible to show
that a preference restriction is not feasible. A revealed preference feasibility test for
weak complementarity is presented here. With weak complementarity deﬁned by the
observable property of nonessentiality and the unobservable property of no-existence-
value, the latter is the actual preference restriction. It is shown that no-existence-
value is feasible if and only if an observable revealed preference condition of “single-
preference” is satisﬁed. This strong revealed preference condition is nontrivial when
there are two or more market goods in addition to the weak complement. With simple
Samuelsonian revealed preference we can falsify single-preference and thereby reject
weak complementarity. Stone-Geary numeric examples are included to demonstrate
these and other results.
Keywords: Weak complementarity, Nonessentiality, No-existence-value, Testing prefer-
ence restrictions, Feasibility condition, Single-preference, Samuelsonian revealed pref-
erence.
i1 Introduction
A core methodological problem of nonmarket goods is that revealed preference from market
demand does not by itself provide suﬃcient information for welfare analysis. There are
several diverse methodological approaches for providing the necessary additional preference
information. One approach involves imposing intuitively appealing preference assumptions,
typically called “preference restrictions” or “maintained hypotheses.” The principal example
is weak complementarity as introduced by M¨ aler.1 It is widely thought that preference
restrictions in general, and weak complementarity in particular, cannot be tested against
revealed preference. In this paper I provide a nontrivial observable feasibility condition for
weak complementarity that permits such testing.
This model is based on the standard understanding of consumer behavior in the context
of nonmarket goods. Let z represent a nonmarket good that as a variable can take on any
values of the set Z. A nonmarket good may be discrete or continuous, and the values it takes
on might be scalars, vectors, or even non-numerical attributes such as Z = {Poor Fishery,
Thriving Fishery}.2 Superscripts are used to distinguish individual elements of Z, as in
za,zb ∈ Z. Let X = ℜL
+ be the commodity consumption set with typical element x =
(x1,...,xL), and deﬁne Y = X ×Z with typical element (x,z). The consumer is thought to
have a complete and transitive preference relation on Y , designated by %Y , which is typically
represented by a utility function UY so that UY (xa,za) ≥ UY (xb,zb) ⇐⇒ (xa,za) %Y (xb,zb)
for all possible pairs of (x,z) vectors (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y .3 For each ﬁxed value of z, I assume
that %Y is continuous on X, and also strictly convex and strongly monotone on the interior
of X but only require it to be simply convex and weakly monotone on the boundary.4 With
these assumptions the demand relation is single valued, i.e., a function.
1The weak complementarity concept was ﬁrst fully developed in M¨ aler (1971) but the terminology was
not introduced until later in M¨ aler (1974).
2M¨ aler’s ﬁrst example was ﬁshery quality, although as a continuous variable.
3I use both preference notation and utility functions in this presentation, often in parallel. This redun-
dancy has a purpose so that I ask the reader to bear with me. The work presented here is conceptually
based on preference theory and is most directly conveyed with preference notation. Moreover, overreliance
on utility function representation of preference can open the door to some erroneous conclusions, as we shall
see. However most readers are probably much more familiar with utility function representation than with
preference notation. I have therefore also included some utility function representation to help convey the
development. Of course, utility functions are indispensable for fully deﬁning speciﬁc preference relations, as
in the my examples section, and also for some other purposes.
4For example with Cobb-Douglas deﬁned on the entirety of X using the traditional exponential utility
function, it is strictly convex and strongly monotone only on the interior of X. However, along the boundary
is only simply convex and weakly monotone.
1The consumer is able to choose some x ∈ X subject to his budget constraint, but is not
able to choose z ∈ Z. Instead, the nonmarket good is treated as a state variable, like prices
or wealth, that deﬁne the choice context. With the standard model, the consumer optimizes
his choice by solving the constrained optimization problem,
max
x UY (x,z) (1)
s.t. p   x ≤ w,
x ∈ X,
where p ∈ ℜL
++ is the vector of market good prices and w > 0 is the individual’s wealth.5
The consumer’s demand function is deﬁned as the solution function to this problem. It can
also be characterized in purely preference-theoretic terms,
  x(p,z,w) = {x ∈ X|p   x ≤ w, and (x,z) %Y (¯ x,z) for all ¯ x ∈ X such that p   ¯ x ≤ w}. (2)
For each value of z the consumer chooses the preference maximizing aﬀordable commod-
ity bundle. Thus the nonmarket good parameterizes the choice problem and the demand
function in the same way as prices and wealth.
We are able to observe the consumers economic behavior as represented by the demand
function, but are not able to directly observe the preference relation %Y or any representative
utility function such as UY .
2 Available revealed preference information
Consumers reveal their commodity preference as they choose bundles of goods for various
combinations of p, z and w, as indicated by program (1) and equation (2). Since they are
not able to choose z values in the market, revealed preference is not available for diﬀerences
in these values. Furthermore, commodity revealed preference is only available across those
bundles that the consumer might actually obtain as indicated by the demand function. For
each z ∈ Z, the obtainable set in X is   Xz = {x ∈ X |x =   x(p,z,w) for some (p,w) ∈ ℜ
L+1
++ }.6
5Following Mas-Colell et al. (1995), I use wealth instead of income. The seminal M¨ aler (1971) uses “lump
sum income” which is arguably more akin to wealth, a stock variable, than income, a ﬂow variable.
6Here are three examples of obtainable sets: 1) With Cobb-Douglas or CES preference, the obtainable set
is the strictly positive orthant ℜL
++ so that at least of some of each commodity is always consumed. 2) With
Leontief preference the obtainable set is a ray from the origin (not including the origin). 3) With quasilinear
preference, the obtainable set will typically include some commodity vectors with no consumption of some
goods, i.e., corner solutions. This distinction between X and the obtainable subset is also used by Richter
(1971).
2I assume that each   Xz is closed under weak monotone superiority. Then with z ∈ Z, x1 ∈   Xz
and x2 ∈ X with x2
ℓ ≥ x1
ℓ for all ℓ = 1,...,L, we also have x2 ∈   Xz.7
Let ¯ z ∈ Z, pa ∈ ℜL
++, wa > 0 and xa =   x(pa, ¯ z,wa). Then with the nonmarket good ﬁxed
at ¯ z, simple Samuelsonian revealed preference allows us to say that xa is revealed preferred
to all xb ∈ X such that xb  = xa and pa xb ≤ wa. In particular we then know that (xa, ¯ z) ≻Y
(xb, ¯ z) and UY (xa, ¯ z) > UY (xb, ¯ z) for all such xb. With this approach the maximal revealed
preference information that we can possibly recover is complete knowledge of %Y for each
ﬁxed value of the nonmarket good as restricted to the respective obtainable sets.8 For each
z ∈ Z, let %z be the preference relation on   Xz such that for all xa,xb ∈   Xz, xa %z xb ⇐⇒
(xa,z) %Y (xb,z). From the properties of %Y we know that each %z is transitive, complete,
continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone. The set {%z |z ∈ Z} represents all
possible revealed preference information. Utility function representations of these z-speciﬁc
preference relations can be useful. For all z ∈ Z, there must exist representative utility
functions uz(x) such that uz(xa) ≥ uz(xb) ⇐⇒ xa %z xb for all xa,xb ∈   Xz.9
We are now working with two levels of revealed preference information. The ﬁrst is
simple Samuelsonian revealed preference, such as with the (xa, ¯ z) ≻Y (xb, ¯ z) example at
the beginning of the preceding paragraph. At the second level, we have the individual %z
preference relations which extend simple revealed preference to a complete relation on each
  Xz.10 The corresponding representative uz utility functions might be obtained by solving
the integrability problem for each z ∈ Z.11 I am not assuming that all of each %z preference
relation is available to the analyst, such as in the form of their representative utility functions,
but will later indicate some of their possible uses and misuses when they are available. Such
7This monotonic closure of   Xz may well follow from the continuity, convexity and monotonicity assump-
tions. All well known preference families with these properties have monotonically closed obtainable sets.
8This statement is a slight simpliﬁcation. Any actual instance of simple Samuelsonian revealed preference
involves a single point that is realized by the demand function and is therefore a member of the obtainable
set. However the other points that are revealed to be inferior to the ﬁrst point are not restricted to the
obtainable set. For example, xa as deﬁned at the beginning of the paragraph is a member of   X¯ z, but the xb
points need not be.
9The existence of these utility functions follows from standard utility representation theory such as pre-
sented in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), section 3C, and does not imply that they are known to the analyst. The
use of z as an index on %z and uz(x) might suggest that Z is a countable set. However as I indicated previ-
ously, z may be a real valued continuous variable or even a real vector. In that context {%z} would probably
be obtained as a parametric continuum, so that uz(x) would be speciﬁed with a parametric representation
deﬁned on z ∈ Z.
10This distinction between the two levels of revealed preference is equivalent to the distinction that Varian
(1988) makes in his second paragraph between “revealed preference theory” and “integrability theory.”
11See Mas-Colell et al. (1995), section 3H.
3an assumption would be equivalent to assuming that all of the z-speciﬁc Hicksian demand
functions are available.12
There is another way of seeing that the set {%z |z ∈ Z} includes all possible revealed
preference information. By deﬁnition, Samuelsonian revealed preference information is only
revealed through the demand function as with our earlier example. It follows that any
preference information that is not needed for the construction of the demand function cannot
be revealed from the demand function. Our demand function can be fully speciﬁed purely
in terms of {%z |z ∈ Z}, without any of the additional preference information available in
%Y ,
  x(p,z,w) = {x ∈   Xz |p   x ≤ w, and x %z ¯ x for all ¯ x ∈   Xz such that p   ¯ x ≤ w}.
Therefore none of the additional preference information available in %Y can be recovered as
revealed preference. The preference information content of the demand function and the set
{%z |z ∈ Z} are exactly the same.
This can also be seen with the representative utility functions {uz |z ∈ Z}. For each
z ∈ Z, let xz(p,w) be the solution function to the constrained optimization problem,
max
x uz(x)
s.t. p   x ≤ w,
x ∈   Xz.
Then for all p ∈ ℜL
++, z ∈ Z and w > 0, we have   x(p,z,w) = xz(p,w). Thus the ordinal
preference information of all the uz representative utility functions is suﬃcient for construct-
ing the   x demand function, and none of the additional information available in UY can be
recovered from the demand function.
It is well understood that utility function representations are not unique so that we
can apply monotonic transformations to the uz functions and obtain diﬀerent but equally
valid representative utility functions. These monotonic transformations can vary with z.
12With Marshallian demand and the uz utility functions we could easily construct the z-speciﬁc indirect
utility functions, and from them obtain z-speciﬁc expenditure functions and ﬁnally the z-speciﬁc Hicksian
demand functions. Even ordinary exact welfare values, such as for changes in commodity prices, cannot
be obtained directly from Marshallian demand. Either Hicksian demand is required, or its equivalent such
as with expenditure and indirect utility functions. Presupposing the availability of Hicksian demand is a
substantial assumption. Supposing the accessibility of the uz utility functions is an equivalent assumption.
As this paper is not focused on specifying welfare measures, neither assumption is necessary. Furthermore,
forgoing the latter assumption about the uz functions underscores the development later in the paper show-
ing that weak complementarity can be directly falsiﬁed with Marshallian demand through simple revealed
preference.
4For each z ∈ Z, let gz : ℜ → ℜ be a strictly increasing function and deﬁne the utility
function ug
z :   Xz → ℜ by ug
z(x) = gz (uz(x)). Then the set of utility functions {ug
z |z ∈ Z}
includes exactly the same ordinal preference information as the original set so that there is
no justiﬁcation for choosing one over the other based on revealed preference.
3 Indeterminate welfare analysis and testing prefer-
ence restrictions
Suppose that we wish to measure the change in welfare for a shift in the nonmarket good
value from za to zb with price and wealth respectively ﬁxed at ¯ p and ¯ w. For example, with
the compensating variation welfare measure we are seeking the CV value such that,13












or in terms of the unknown representative utility function,












This requires preference information across diﬀerent z values. That is, for at least some
pairs of elements from the preference domain, (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y with za  = zb, we need to
know whether or not (xa,za) %Y (xb,zb). However, as we have seen this information is not
available from revealed preference.
If the analyst has available a set of utility functions such as {uz |z ∈ Z} that represents
the set of z-ﬁxed preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z}, there may be some temptation to con-
struct from these a utility function on Y , U0(x,z) = uz(x) for (x,z) ∈ Y and x ∈   Xz, and
use this for welfare analysis involving changes in the nonmarket good.14 However, there is no
basis for concluding that U0(x,z) represents the consumer’s original unobserved preference
relation %Y .
Consider for example an alternative set of representative utility functions such as {ug
z |z ∈
Z} obtained from the original set with a set of z-speciﬁc transforms {gz(u)|z ∈ Z}, as
13See Mas-Colell et al. (1995), section 3I, for the standard deﬁnition of this measure, i.e., without non-
market goods. Bockstael and Kling (1988), Larson (1991), Bockstael and McConnell (1993), Herriges et al.
(2004), Smith and Banzhaf (2004), and Bullock and Minot (2006) all use compensating variation measures
for a change in the nonmarket good value that are equivalent to the one used here, while Ebert (1998) uses
an equivalent variation (“EV ”) measure.
14Technically U0 is not necessarily deﬁned on the entirety of Y but rather on the obtainable subset
  Y = {(x,z) ∈ Y |x ∈   Xz for z ∈ Z}. However this is suﬃcient for any welfare question involving changes in
p, z and w.
5discussed at the end of the preceding section. We can construct another utility function
on Y with these, Ug(x,z) = ug
z(x) for all (x,z) ∈ Y with x ∈   Xz. If any two of the gz
functions are not identical, gza  = gzb for some za,zb ∈ Z, then for any simple monotonic
transformation f : ℜ → ℜ with f′(u) > 0 we would have f (U(x,z))  = Ug(x,z) for at least
some (x,z) ∈ Y , so that U0 and Ug represent diﬀerent preference relations on Y . With two
sets of utility functions such as {uz |z ∈ Z} and {ug
z |z ∈ Z}, since there is no reason for
choosing one over the other based on revealed preference, we also have no basis for choosing
between U0 and Ug, and hence no basis for choosing either one as a representation of %Y .
With all the possible sets of g-transforms we have a vast variety of diﬀerent feasible
preference relations on Y that will yield wildly divergent welfare measure values.15 For
example, Herriges et al. (2004) include an empirical example with two substantially positive
CV estimates where one is more than three times the size of the other. However the problem
is more serious than this example indicates. Some preference relations on Y represented by
Ug-type utility functions will yield very positive CV values and others will yield very negative
values. Consequently it is not possible to know from revealed preference alone even whether
the change from za to zb is beneﬁcial or detrimental.16
There are several diverse methodological approaches for providing suﬃcient additional
preference information so that we can obtain a well-deﬁned unique welfare measure value,
such as for compensating variation. These include various combinations of survey meth-
ods, indirect measures and “reasonable” assumptions.17 Implicity the goal of each of these
methodologies is to isolate one of the many feasible preference relations on Y , and to identify
it as being the most reasonable based on the rationale of the given methodology. One class
of methodologies involves simply imposing one or more intuitively appealing preference as-
sumptions. These are typically called “preference restrictions” or “maintained hypotheses.”
The assumption or set of assumptions is usually suﬃciently strong so that the analyst is able
to isolate a unique feasible preference relation on Y without additional nonmarket data such
as survey information. Weak complementarity is the most prevalent preference restriction
in the literature. It will be examined in the next section.
A preference relation on Y that is identiﬁed with a given preference restriction is equally
consistent with any revealed preference information as all the other diverse feasible preference
relations on Y . Therefore, there can be no test using revealed preference for verifying that the
15Feasibility requires consistency with all possible revealed preference, {%z |z ∈ Z}. Ebert (1998, 2001),
Herriges et al. (2004) and von Haefen (2007) also provide clear statements of the diversity of feasible pref-
erence relations characterized in terms of utility function transformations like my set of gz transforms.
16This is illustrated in my section of numeric examples.
17See Champ et al. (2003) for a practical survey of these techniques.
6identiﬁed preference relation is the “true” relation %Y . This is well known in the literature.
Unfortunately this relatively narrow result is usually asserted only implicity in the context
of a much more general statement such that the preference restriction cannot be tested at
all against revealed preference.18
These general statements are fallacious. The inability to aﬃrm that %Y satisﬁes a partic-
ular preference restriction does not imply an inability to deny it. Thus we must distinguish
between two types of tests. The test discussed in the preceding paragraph seeks to aﬃrm
that the “true” relation %Y satisﬁes the preference restriction, given that there exists a feasi-
ble preference relation on Y that is consistent with the given preference restriction. We have
seen that this type of test is not possible. The general statements of testing impossibility
implicity assume the existence of such a feasible and consistent preference relation. However
this implicit assumption need not be true. It is possible that none of the feasible preference
relations on Y are consistent with the given preference restriction, and this can be tested.
The set of feasible preference relations on Y is only limited by the set of possible revealed
preference, {%z |z ∈ Z}. If all of the feasible preference relations on Y are inconsistent with
the given preference restriction, then that preference restriction must be inconsistent with
revealed preference in the form of {%z |z ∈ Z} and is itself not feasible. It follows that we
can sometimes test the preference restriction against revealed preference and conclude that
the restriction is not feasible.
Thus while it is not possible to aﬃrm preference restrictions with revealed preference, it
is possible to deny preference restrictions with revealed preference. I demonstrate this by
showing that the feasibility of weak complementarity requires a strong condition in revealed
preference.
18For example Ebert (2001, p. 374) states that “one is unable to reject” preference restrictions. Several
others provide this kind of general impossibility statement for the speciﬁc case of weak complementarity. For
instance Bockstael and McConnell (1993, p. 1254, footnote 9) state that “[w]e can never test the hypothesis
of weak complementarity; we can only judge whether this link between the public and private good is
reasonable” (where the public good is a nonmarket good). von Haefen (2007, p. 16) characterizes weak
complementarity as an “intuitive but untestable restriction.” In the context of a speciﬁc application, Herriges
et al. (2004, p. 63) do provide a concise characterization of the actual narrow result, describing the choice
between two alternative welfare measures as “the choice between non-testable preference restrictions.” If an
valid exact welfare measure is properly obtained from a preference restriction, then that preference restriction
must be aﬃliated with a feasible preference relation on Y and hence cannot be tested. However the overall
theme of Herriges et al. (2004) emphasizes the general non-testability of preference restrictions.
74 Preference properties of weak complementarity
Weak complementarity is the most common preference restriction in the literature and has
been called “the foundation of the theory of welfare measurement of environmental quality
changes.”19 It involves a relationship between the nonmarket good and one of the market
goods, the “weak complement.”20 M¨ aler’s ﬁrst example was the relationship between the
quality of a public ﬁshery and sport ﬁshing (nonmarket and market good respectively).21
A similar example from Bockstael and McConnell (1993) involves wildlife populations in a
sanctuary and tourist trips to the sanctuary. In some presentations the nonmarket good is a
quality of the market good, while others simply require that they be “consumed” together.
Without loss of generality, I shall assume that the nonmarket good is associated with the
ﬁrst market good, x1. Given this relationship, weak complementarity requires two preference
properties, one which may be observed from revealed preference and another imposed as a
preference assumption. This second property is thus the actual “preference restriction” or
“maintained hypothesis.”
The ﬁrst property is nonessentiality. There are two versions of it in the literature. Willig
(1978) originally deﬁned nonessentiality as requiring that “any bundle including good 1
can be matched in the preference ordering by some other bundle which excludes good 1.”22
Formally, for any xa ∈ X and z ∈ Z there must exist some xb = (xb
1,...,xb
L) ∈ X with xb
1 = 0
such that (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z). Most of the weak complementarity literature requires a slightly
stronger property whereby the preference matching is restricted to those commodity vectors
that can be obtained via the demand function.23 Then for any z ∈ Z and any xa ∈   Xz,
there must exist some xb ∈   Xz with xb
1 = 0 such that (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z), or in terms of utility,
UY (xa,z) = UY (xb,z). The distinction between the two types of nonessentiality is equivalent
to the distinction between inﬁnite and ﬁnite choke prices for good one. Henceforth I shall
use the term nonessentiality to refer to the stronger property.
19Bockstael and Kling (1988, p. 63).
20It is possible that there are more than one weak complement, as with Bockstael and Kling (1988). The
work presented here can be easily generalized to accommodate that.
21M¨ aler (1971).
22The word “other” is not actually operational in the deﬁnition so that the two bundles can be the same.
von Haefen (2007) provides an equivalent characterization of nonessentiality.
23The weak complementarity literature actually tends to be rather vague on nonessentiality. It is sometimes
not explicitly considered while clearly still an implicit requirement such as with Larson (1991), Herriges et al.
(2004), and Bullock and Minot (2006). Others, such as Smith and Banzhaf (2004) initially state it in terms
Willig’s original characterization but in their analysis clearly require the stronger version adopted here.
My statement of the stronger version is equivalent with the characterizations provided by Bockstael and
McConnell (1993), and Palmquist (2005).
8No-existence-value is the second required preference property associated with weak com-
plementarity.24 This property tells us that the consumer does not care about the value of z
when the consumption bundle is ﬁxed with x1 = 0. Thus the nonmarket good does not have
any stand-alone existence value, but rather has only use value in conjunction with the con-
sumption of the weak complement, good one.25 Beginning with M¨ aler (1971), this property




For the purposes of this paper it is more convenient to use a preference characterization of
no-existence-value: for any x ∈ X with x1 = 0 and any za,zb ∈ Z we have (x,za) ∼Y (x,zb),
or in terms of utility, UY (x,za) = UY (x,zb).26
One of these two properties, nonessentiality, can be restated purely in terms of the set
of z-ﬁxed preference relations, {%z |z ∈ Z}: for any z ∈ Z and any xa ∈   Xz, there must
exist some xb ∈   Xz with xb
1 = 0 such that xa ∼z xb, or in terms of utility, uz(xa) = uz(xb).
Therefore nonessentiality can be veriﬁed against revealed preference and is not a “prefer-
ence restriction.” However the deﬁnition of no-existence-value requires preference comparison
across diﬀerent z values and consequently cannot be veriﬁed with revealed preference. It is
a “preference restriction” or “maintained hypothesis.” I next present an observable revealed
preference condition that is necessary and suﬃcient for the feasibility of no-existence-value.
5 Single-preference and no-existence-value feasibility
“Single-preference” is a potential property of the set of z-ﬁxed preferences {%z |z ∈ Z} in
relationship to some subset of X. With single-preference all of the individual %z relations
agree with each other on the subset so that there is a single preference relation on that limited
preference domain. Based on this intuitive understanding we would have single-preference
on some subset   X ⊆ X if x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈   X.
However, this characterization implicity requires that both %za and %zb be complete on
  X so that   X ⊆   Xza and   X ⊆   Xzb. A somewhat more complicated statement of single-
preference is required when some %z might not be complete on   X. In this context the key
24Beginning with M¨ aler (1974), weak complementarity is deﬁned most often in the literature as the property
that I call no-existence-value. However the need for both properties is often not clear in these presentations.
My two-property deﬁnition of weak complementarity follows Palmquist (2005) and von Haefen (2007), and
facilitates a more clear understanding of the distinct roles of both properties.
25See Herriges et al. (2004) for a more precise understanding of use and existence value.
26Willig (1978) also uses this utility equality characterization of no-existence-value.
9intuition of single-preference is that for any za,zb ∈ Z, the two preference relations %za and
%zb do not disagree with each other on   X, which is equivalent to requiring them to agree
with each other on the intersection   X
    Xza
    Xzb:
Deﬁnition. For a given a set of z-ﬁxed preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z} deﬁned respectively
on the obtainable sets   Xz, we have single-preference on some subset of commodity space
  X ⊆ X when x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈   X
    Xza
    Xzb.
In the context of no-existence-value we are concerned with the subset of X where the
supposed weak complement, good one, is zero, X0
1 = {x ∈ X |x1 = 0}. With L = 2 the
set X0
1 is the vertical axis, and with L = 3 it is a quarter-plane taking on all nonnegative
combinations of the other two goods. In general it is the nonnegative portion of a hyperplane
with dimension L − 1.
We have this important relationship between no-existence-value feasibility and single-
preference on X0
1:
Theorem 1. No-existence-value is feasible if and only if the set of possible revealed preference
{%z |z ∈ Z} has single-preference on X0
1.
Thus without single-preference on X0
1, the nonmarket good must have existence value.
Single-preference on X0
1 can also be characterized in terms of indiﬀerence:
Theorem 2. The set of possible revealed preference {%z |z ∈ Z} has single-preference on
X0
1 if and only if x1 ∼za x2 ⇔ x1 ∼zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb.
As I will demonstrate, this second theorem allows us to recognize the absence or presence of
single-preference on X0
1 respectively by whether or not indiﬀerence curves cross for diﬀerent
z values. The proofs of both theorems are provided in the appendix.
The observable property of nonessentiality also has a role here. It directly follows from
nonessentiality that for each z ∈ Z the set   Xz
 
X0
1 is not empty. Moreover with each %z
continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone, with nonessentiality we will typically ﬁnd
that the interior of X0
1, in the L−1 dimensional hyperplane deﬁned by x1 = 0, is included in
each obtainable set   Xz. For example with L = 2 we would ﬁnd all of the standard vertical
axis, except for the origin, included in each obtainable set. With L = 3 the interior of X0
1
is the open quarter-plane with x1 = 0 and all strictly positive combinations of the other
two goods. Thus with nonessentiality, the presence or absence of single-preference on X0
1
may be readily observed from revealed preference, allowing us to easily test the feasibility of
no-existence-value.
10When there are only two market goods, single-preference on X0
1 is always satisﬁed so that
no-existence-value is always feasible and the testing implications of Theorem 1 are trivial.27
However with L ≥ 3 single-preference on X0
1 is not automatic. Then Theorem 1 provides
us with a nontrivial revealed preference test of no-existence-value. Lack of single-preference
is depicted in Figure 1 for L = 3. From Theorem 2, without single-preference there must
be two points x1,x2 ∈ X0
1 such that for some za,zb ∈ Z, we have x1,x2 ∈   Xza
    Xzb and
x1 ∼za x2 but not x1 ∼zb x2. This is all depicted in Figure 1 as x1 and x2 are on the same
za-indiﬀerence set in X0
1 represented by Ia but not on the same zb-indiﬀerence set. The
zb-indiﬀerence set that includes x1 is represented by Ib. It is depicted as passing above x2










Figure 1: Without single-preference on X0
1, no-existence-value is not feasible
We can also see in Figure 1 that no-existence-value is not feasible. From %za we have
x1 ∼za x2 and hence (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,za). Similarly, from %zb we have x1 ≁zb x2 and
hence (x1,zb) ≁Y (x2,zb).28 If no-existence-value were feasible then we could also have
27With L = 2, X0
1 is the vertical axis so that with monotonicity all preference relations on any subset
of X0
1 are fully deﬁned by the increasing value of good two. Therefore all of the individual %z relations
agree with each other on X0
1, giving us single-preference on X0
1. Then from Theorem 1, no-existence-value
is always feasible when L = 2.
28The symbol “≁” indicates “not ∼” or “not indiﬀerent to.”
11(x1,za) ∼Y (x1,zb) and (x2,za) ∼Y (x2,zb) without fear of contradiction. However with
these two and (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,za), we get (x1,zb) ∼Y (x2,zb) from transitivity which directly
contradicts %zb. Thus the basic preference properties implied by lack of single-preference on
X0
1 precludes the possibility of no-existence-value.
Absence of single-preference can be also observed with Marshallian demand and simple
Samuelsonian revealed preference. Without single-preference on X0
1 (and with L ≥ 3) there
must be intersections of indiﬀerence sets for diﬀerent z-values such as depicted at point x1
in Figure 1.29 With continuity of preference such intersections cannot exist in isolation.
Instead we will have an inﬁnite mesh of such intersections which can be imagined with
Figure 1 by adding za-indiﬀerence curves parallel to Ia and zb-indiﬀerence curves parallel
to Ib. These intersections or crossings allow us we to observe from simple Samuelsonian
revealed preference that no-existence-value is not feasible.
Another indiﬀerence set intersection is depicted in Figure 2, again with L = 3 but with
a diﬀerent axes alignment than presented in Figure 1. Here we again have a %za indiﬀerence
curve Ia, and a %zb indiﬀerence curve Ib, both in X0
1 that this time cross at the point x0.
Almost any such crossing can be detected with simple Samuelsonian revealed preference.30
In Figure 2 we have points xa ∈ Ia and xb ∈ Ib on the tangents of these indiﬀerence curves
with two budget lines so that xa =   x(pa,za,wa) and xb =   x(pb,zb,wb) for some price and
wealth combinations (pa,wa),(pb,wb) ∈ ℜ
L+1
++ .31 It is clear that xb is in the budget set when
xa is chosen and xa is in the budget set when xb is chosen (pa   xb < wa and pb   xa < wb) so
that xa is za-revealed preferred to xb, and xb is zb-revealed preferred to xa. Thus from simple
Samuelsonian revealed preference we know that xa ≻za xb and xb ≻zb xa, which violates
single-preference on X0
1. Then from Theorem 1 no-existence-value is impossible.
With just the two observed demand points xa =   x(pa,za,wa) and xb =   x(pb,zb,wb) in
Figure 2 we can also contradict no-existence-value directly without reference to Theorem 1.
With no-existence-value we would have (xa,za) ∼Y (xa,zb) and (xb,za) ∼Y (xb,zb). Simple
revealed preference from xa =   x(pa,za,wa) and pa   xb ≤ wa gives us (xa,za) ≻Y (xb,za) so
that with transitivity we would have (xa,zb) ≻Y (xb,zb). However this conﬂicts with the
simple revealed preference observation that (xb,zb) ≻Y (xa,zb) [from xb =   x(pb,zb,wb) and
29Without any such intersections, for any two za,zb ∈ Z, the partition of X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb into indiﬀerence
sets would the same for both %za and %zb. Then from Theorem 2 we would have single-preference on X0
1.
30A possible exception is when the crossing occurs at a tangent that is common to both curves. However
such tangent crossings are individually isolated and are locally surrounded by crossings that are not tangent,
such as the one depicted in Figure 2.
31The two budget lines depicted in Figure 2 are the intersections of X0
1 with the budget planes respectively
deﬁned by pa   x = wa and pb   x = wb. Obtaining xa and xb from the demand function requires that the














pa   x = wa
pb   x = wb
Figure 2: Falsifying no-existence-value with revealed preference
pb xa ≤ wb]. Therefore with simple Samuelsonian revealed preference we can directly falsify
no-existence-value and thus demonstrate by direct observation that weak complementarity
is not feasible.
6 Numeric Examples
The results presented above are illustrated in this section using z-speciﬁc preference relations
that can be represented by Stone-Geary utility functions of the form






where φ > 0, and for all z ∈ Z and all ℓ = 1,...,L, αℓ(z) > 0 and
 L
ℓ=1 αℓ(z) = 1.32
Nonessentiality is satisﬁed with the φ > 0 restriction. For each z ∈ Z, the choke price of the
32Larson (1991) and Palmquist (2005) also provide examples based on Stone-Geary preference.







Each of the L component demand functions includes two cases, one for interior solutions
when the price of good one is less than this choke price and one for corner solutions in X0
1.
For good one this becomes







− φ if p1 < pc
1(z)
0 if p1 ≥ pc
1(z)
, (4)
and for the other goods, j = 2,...,L, we have







if p1 < pc
1(z)
wαj(z)
pj (1 − α1(z))
if p1 ≥ pc
1(z)
. (5)
From these demand functions we can see that the obtainable set is the same for all z ∈ Z,
  Xz = {x ∈ X |x1 ≥ 0 and xℓ > 0 for ℓ = 2,...,L}. Therefore each obtainable set   Xz
includes the entire interior of X0
1.
I will work with L = 3 and up to three z values, Z = {za,zb,zc}. In this context I am able
to adopt a simpliﬁed notation so that the set of possible revealed preference is {%a,%b,%c}
with the individual relations respectively represented by












These three utility functions clearly represent three diﬀerent preference relations on   Xz.
With these I ﬁrst demonstrate the wide variability of possible welfare measure values when
we only have revealed preference to work with. I then provide applications of Theorem 1,
ﬁrst to preclude the possibility of weak complementarity, and then to guarantee the existence
of a feasible weak complementarity solution. I close this section with a demonstration of
how weak complementarity may be falsiﬁed from simple Samuelsonian revealed preference.
A compensating variation welfare measure can be constructed with any utility function
deﬁned on Y that is consistent with the set of possible revealed preference. For each θ > 0,
the utility function uθ(x) = (ub(x))
θ represents %b on   Xz. We can construct a parameterized



















1/4 if z = zc
. (6)
14With these representations of preference on Y we can see that zb is valued more with higher
values of θ. With each of these utility functions we can use equation (3) to solve for CV
values. With ¯ p = (1,1,1), ¯ w = 52 and a change from za to zb, θ = 0.7 gives us CV = −173.8
while θ = 1.4 gives us CV = 38.5.33 Both of these CV values are large in the context of our
wealth value. Thus with only revealed preference, we cannot even determine whether the
change in z represents a major improvement or a major reduction in welfare.
This last result illustrates the rather dramatic need for some methodology such as apply-
ing weak complementarity as a preference restriction. However, any implementation of weak
complementarity requires that no-existence-value be feasible. Since L = 3, this feasibility is
not a trivial issue and may be tested via Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 is only concerned with preference on X0







































to obtain preference relations on X0
1 respectively deﬁned by
u
h










c(x2,x3) = hc (uc(0,x2,x3)) = (x2)
2/3 (x3)
1/3 .
From this we can see that the preference set {%a,%b,%c} does not have single-preference on
X0
1. Even though %a and %b are identical on X0
1, %c is diﬀerent so that single-preference
is not satisﬁed. It then follows from Theorem 1 that no-existence-value is not feasible, and
therefore weak complementarity cannot be applied.
33Initial demand   x(¯ p,za, ¯ w) is an interior solution with equations (4) and (5). For both values of θ, the
demand after compensation   x(¯ p,zb, ¯ w − CV ) is also an interior solution. Values of θ ≥ 1.44 will yield
corner solutions such that x1 = 0. Taking limits across both interior and corner solutions, as θ → 0 we get
CV → −∞, and as θ → ∞ we get CV → ¯ w.
15Suppose now that the set of permissible nonmarket good values is instead   Z = {za,zb}
with the set of possible revealed preference {%a,%b}. We have already seen that these two
preference relations are the same on X0
1 so that single-preference is satisﬁed, and from Theo-
rem 1 it follows that no-existence-value is feasible. Since nonessentiality is also satisﬁed, we
should be able to specify a weak complementarity preference relation on Y that is consistent
with {%a,%b}. A utility function on Y representing weak complementarity preference can
















2/3 if z = zb
.
This preference relation on X ×   Z is unique in being consistent with {%a,%b} while also
satisfying no-existence-value.34 It is not represented by any member of the Uθ family of
utility functions presented in equation (6).35 Again with ﬁxed ¯ p = (1,1,1) and ¯ w = 52,
and a change from za to zb we can use equation (3) with Uwc to obtain a unique weak
complementarity CV value, CV = 13.6.
Previously we used Theorem 1 with the set of possible revealed preference {%a,%b,%c} to
reject the feasibility of no-existence-value. In such a situation we can also use simple Samuel-
sonian revealed preference to reject no-existence-value and with it weak complementarity.
Let pb = (8,7,8), wb = 84, pc = (3,5,3), wc = 45, xb =   x(pb,zb,wb) and xc =   x(pc,zc,wc).
Then from equations (4) and (5) we get xb = (0,4,7) and xc = (0,6,5) so that both com-
modity vectors are in X0
1. We also have pb   xc = 82 ≤ wb and pc   xb = 41 ≤ wc, so that
xb is zb-revealed preferred to xc and xc is zc-revealed preferred to xb. This is a revealed
preference violation of single-preference on X0
1, so that with Theorem 1 we are able to re-
ject no-existence-value based on observed (or estimated) Marshallian demand. We can also
reject no-existence-value directly, without reference to the theorem, based on the reasoning
developed at the end of the previous section.
34No-existence-value deﬁnes a unique relation on X×   Z by aﬃliating indiﬀerence sets in X across diﬀerent
z values based on their common subsets in X1
0. These common subsets would not exist without single-
preference on X1
0.
35Our weak complementarity utility function cannot be obtained as a simple monotonic transformation
of any of the parameterized family of utility functions presented in equation (6) after eliminating zc. That
is, there is no increasing real valued function f(u) such that Uwc(x,z) = f (Uθ(x,z)) for some θ > 0 and
for all x ∈ X and all z ∈   Z. Therefore none of the Uθ utility functions represent a weak complementarity
compliant preference relation even after dropping zc from Z.
167 Conclusions
It is well understood that there are multiple feasible preference relations on Y , and hence it is
not possible to determine the “true” one based on revealed preference. Preference restrictions
such as weak complementarity are one way of dealing with this problem. They are imposed
as assumptions with the goal of creating suﬃcient additional preference structure so that a
unique welfare measure value may be identiﬁed, such as with compensating variation. If the
preference restriction is feasible, it follows that the restriction cannot tested against revealed
preference to see if it describes the “true” %Y .
All of this is well understood in the literature except that it has not been recognized that
a given preference restriction may not be feasible in the ﬁrst place. Omitting this possibility
from consideration has led to two types of erroneous claims. The ﬁrst vastly inﬂates testing
impossibility such that it is simply not possible to test preference restrictions against revealed
preference. Usually these statements simply ignore the possibility that the restriction may
not be feasible.36 However some explicitly reject the possibility of nontrivial observable
feasibility conditions.37 The second kind of erroneous claim immediately follows from the
ﬁrst. If we cannot reject a given preference restriction then it is technically universally
applicable so that the only practical limitation on its application is the analyst’s intuition
as to what makes sense.38
This paper has focused on the example of weak complementarity to show that there
can be observable nontrivial feasibility conditions for preference restrictions. With weak
complementarity deﬁned by the observable property of nonessentiality and the unobservable
property of no-existence-value, the latter is the actual preference restriction. From Theorem
36The statements quoted in note 18 are mostly of this type.
37For example Ebert (1998, p. 242) states that preference restrictions are untestable in general because
“there are no observable implications of the properties imposed.” Similarly, Bockstael and McConnell (1993,
p. 1250) state that weak complementarity “has implications for the structure of preferences which are not
observable (and hence not testable).” In the same vein Herriges et al. (2004, p. 56) state that “apparent
violations of [weak complementarity] are conditional on an assumed functional form for preferences, but
unfortunately these preferences are observationally indistinguishable from alternative functional forms sat-
isfying the [weak complementarity] assumption” (italics in original).
38For example Larson (1991, p. 98) claims to have demonstrated “a method for recovering weakly comple-
mentary preferences when integrating back from any Marshallian demands to recover the quasi-expenditure
function” (italics in original). Even if his methodology can be applied to any Marshallian demand function,
it cannot yield weakly complementary preference if the single-preference condition is not satisﬁed. Later in
this paper Larson concludes that weak complementarity “can be imposed if judged appropriate” (p. 107).
Some of the statements quoted in note 18 also refer to the role of analyst intuition and judgement as the
only real constraint on application.
171 we know that single-preference on X0
1 is necessary and suﬃcient for the feasibility of no-
existence-value. This observable feasibility condition is not trivial when there are two or
more market goods that are not prospective weak complements to the nonmarket good.
Thus when L ≥ 3, the absence of single-preference is a testable condition that allows us to
reject no-existence-value and with it weak complementarity.39 In particular, I have shown
that both single-preference and no-existence-value can be tested with simple Samuelsonian
revealed preference.
Single-preference on X1
0 is a strong condition which increases in strength with L. If we
arbitrarily chose two preference relations that are complete on X = ℜ3
+ (L = 3) and satisfy
nonessentiality, it is highly unlikely that they will agree with each other on X1
0. This chance
occurrence is equivalent to arbitrarily choosing two preference relations on X = ℜ2
+ and
ﬁnding they are exactly the same on the entirety of X. Single-preference requires this exact
matching not just between two preference relations, but across all the preference relations
%z for z ∈ Z. With ever larger values of L, single-preference on X1
0 requires this matching
on ever higher dimensional commodity spaces, and is hence even more unlikely to occur
by chance. Thus single-preference on X1
0 places a strong restriction on the set of possible
revealed preference {%z |z ∈ Z}. For the vast majority of potential {%z |z ∈ Z} sets,
single-preference is not satisﬁed and therefore weak complementarity is not feasible.40
The presence of an observable nontrivial feasibility condition does not appear to be a
consequence of some unique characteristic of weak complementarity in relationship to other
preference restrictions. This is an example of what may well be a prevalent property. For
example, preference restrictions similar to weak complementarity, such as those presented
towards the end of Smith and Banzhaf (2004), also have feasibility conditions requiring
single-preference on a speciﬁed set. It may be that other preference restrictions have other
kinds feasibility conditions that do not involve single-preference.
39All of the models in the papers previously cited in notes 18, 37 and 38 allow for more than two market
goods.
40Most of the literature is speciﬁcally concerned with an explicitly continuous nonmarket good, which is
only an open possibility in this paper. The argument presented here is still valid in that context. Suppose
that Z is the set of positive real numbers and %Y has continuous preference over X × Z. Thus when
|za − zb| < ε for some small ε > 0 we would expect %za and %zb to be very similar on X, including X1
0.
However “very similar” is categorically diﬀerent from being the same. Single-preference would still be special.
18Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 1
Proof. (⇒): For this part I need to establish that feasibility of no-existence-value implies
single-preference on X0
1. Feasibility of no-existence-value requires that it is possible to have
a rational preference relation on Y indicated by %α that satisﬁes no-existence-value and
is consistent with all %z for z ∈ Z. Let za,zb ∈ Z. We then have single-preference
on X0
1 if it follows that x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2 for all x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb. Let
x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb such that x1 %za x2 Then from the feasibility of %α we have
(x1,za) %α (x2,za). From satisfaction of no-existence-value we also have (x1,za) ∼α (x1,zb)
and (x2,za) ∼α (x2,zb). Then by transitivity we get (x1,zb) %α (x2,zb) and hence x1 %zb x2.
I have shown that x1 %za x2 ⇒ x1 %zb x2. Since za,zb are general members of Z we also
have x1 %zb x2 ⇒ x1 %za x2, and hence x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2 so that {%z |z ∈ Z} has
single-preference on X0
1.
(⇐): For this part I need to establish that single-preference on X0
1 implies feasibility of
no-existence-value. No-existence-value is feasible if the requirement that (x,za) ∼Y (x,zb)
for all x ∈ X0
1 and all za,zb ∈ Z is not contradicted by the set of possible revealed preference
{%z |z ∈ Z}. Therefore we only need to consider preference interaction on the limited
preference domain   Y 0
1 = {(x,z) ∈ Y |x ∈   Xz
 
X0
1 for z ∈ Z}. Let %β be a preference
relation on Y such that for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈   Y 0
1 we have (xa,za) %β (xb,zb) if and only
if xa %z xb for at least some z ∈ Z.
I need to show that %β is well deﬁned on   Y 0
1 in the sense that it is not possible to have
both (xa,za) %β (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) ≻β (xa,za) for some (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈   Y 0
1 . This could
occur only if there existed some zc,zd ∈ Z such that xa %zc xb and xb ≻zd xa. However this
would violate single-preference on X0
1. Thus with single-preference on X0
1, %β is well deﬁned
on   Y 0




(xa,z) %β (xb,z) if and only if xa %z xb. Therefore %β is consistent with all {%z |z ∈ Z}
on X0
1.
For any (x,za),(x,zb) ∈   Y 0
1 we have x ∼za x (∼za is reﬂexive) so that (x,za) ∼β (x,zb)
and no-existence-value is satisﬁed. Therefore with single-preference on X0
1, it is possible
to have a no-existence-value preference relation that is consistent with the set of possible
revealed preference, {%z |z ∈ Z}. Thus no-existence-value can not be contradicted by
revealed preference and is hence feasible.
19Theorem 2
Proof. (⇒): For this part I need to establish that with single-preference on X0
1, then x1 ∼za
x2 ⇔ x1 ∼zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb. This implication is
always true for single-preference irrespective of the commodity space subset   X ⊆ X.
With single-preference on   X, and any za,zb ∈ Z and x1,x2 ∈   X
    Xza
    Xzb, we have
x1 ∼za x2 ⇔ [x1 %za x2 and x2 %za x1] ⇔ [x1 %zb x2 and x2 %zb x1] ⇔ x1 ∼zb x2. The
ﬁrst and last equivalencies are from the deﬁnition of indiﬀerence, and the middle one comes
from single-preference.
We have obtained the x1 ∼za x2 ⇔ x1 ∼zb x2 indiﬀerence equivalency statement from
general single-preference but the reverse implication does not hold; the indiﬀerence equiva-
lency statement may be true when general single-preference does not hold. The next step
is to show that the reverse implication does hold for the speciﬁc case of single-preference on
X0
1.
(⇐): For this part I need to establish that whenever x1 ∼za x2 ⇔ x1 ∼zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z
and all x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb, then we also have single-preference on X0
1.
For the sake of clarity I need to change the commodity basket indexing of the indiﬀerence
equivalency statement. Assume that xj ∼za xk ⇔ xj ∼zb xk for all za,zb ∈ Z and all
xj,xk ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb. Let za,zb ∈ Z and x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb such that x1 %za x2.
We want to show that then x1 %zb x2. Deﬁne x3 ∈ X such that the amount of each




for ℓ = 1,...,L. Then x3 ∈ X0
1 and x3 is weakly monotonically superior to both x1 and
x2 in that x3
ℓ ≥ xi
ℓ for i = 1,2 and all ℓ = 1,...,L. I assumed in the paper that all
obtainable sets   Xz are closed under weak monotone superiority so that x3 ∈   Xza. From
monotonic preference we then have x3 %za x1 and the za-preference chain, x3 %za x1 %za x2.
From continuity of preference on X with z = za, there must be some x4 in between x2 and
x3 such that x1 ∼za x4. More formally, there must exist some α ∈ [0,1] such that with
x4 = αx2+(1−α)x3 we have x1 ∼za x4.41 Then from the indiﬀerence equivalency statement
we also have x1 ∼zb x4.42 The new point is weakly monotonically superior to x2 so that
x4 %zb x2. From transitivity we have x1 %zb x2.
I have shown that the indiﬀerence equivalency statement gives us the implication x1 %za
x2 ⇒ x1 %zb x2 for all za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈ X0
1
    Xza
    Xzb. Since za and zb are general
41Since x3 is weakly monotonically superior to x2, any point of the form αx2+(1−α)x3 (α ∈ [0,1]) is also
weakly monotonically superior to x2 and hence an element of   Xza under the monotonic closure assumption.
42From x2 ∈   Xzb and the closure of   Xzb under weak monotonic superiority we have x4 ∈   Xzb.
20members of Z, we also have x1 %zb x2 ⇒ x1 %za x2, and hence x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2 so
that {%z |z ∈ Z} has single-preference on X0
1.
References
Nancy E. Bockstael and Catherine L. Kling. Valuing environmental quality: Weak comple-
mentarity with sets of goods. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70(3):654–662,
August 1988.
Nancy E. Bockstael and Kenneth E. McConnell. Public goods as characteristics of non-
market commodities. The Economic Journal, 103:1244–1257, September 1993.
David S. Bullock and Nicholas Minot. On measuring the value of a nonmarket good using
market data. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(4):961–73, November 2006.
Patricia A. Champ, Kevin J. Boyle, and Thomas C. Brown, editors. A Primer on Nonmar-
ket Valuation. The Economics of Non-Market Goods and Resources. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003.
Udo Ebert. A general approach to the evaluation of nonmarket goods. Resource and Energy
Economics, 23(4):373–88, October 2001.
Udo Ebert. Evaluation of nonmarket goods: Recovering unconditional preferences. American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80(2):241–254, May 1998.
Joseph A. Herriges, Catherine L. Kling, and Daniel J. Phaneuf. What’s the use? welfare
estimates from revealed preference models when weak complementarity does not hold.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47(1):55–70, January 2004.
Douglas M. Larson. Recovering weakly complementary preference. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 21(2):97–108, September 1991.
Karl-G¨ oran M¨ aler. A method of estimating social beneﬁts from pollution control. Swedish
Journal of Economics, 73(1):121–33, March 1971.
Karl-G¨ oran M¨ aler. Environmental Economics: A Theoretical Inquiry. Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press for Resources for the Future, Baltimore; London, 1974.
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Dennis Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
21Raymond B. Palmquist. Weak complementarity, path independence, and the intuition of
the willig condition. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49(1):103–
15, January 2005.
Marcel K. Richter. Rational choice. In John S. Chipman, Leonid Hurwicz, Marcel K. Richter,
and Hugo F. Sonnenschein, editors, Preferences, Utility, and Demand: A Minnesota Sym-
posium, The Harbrace Series in Business and Economics, pages 29–58. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, New York, 1971.
V. Kerry Smith and H. Spencer Banzhaf. A diagrammatic exposition of weak complementar-
ity and the willig condition. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(2):455–66,
May 2004.
Hal R. Varian. Revealed preference with a subset of goods. Journal of Economic Theory, 46
(1):179–185, October 1988.
Roger H. von Haefen. Empirical stategies for incorporating weak complementarity into
consumer demand models. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54(1):
15–31, July 2007.
Robert D. Willig. Incremental consumer’s surplus and hedonic price adjustment. Journal of
Economic Theory, 17(2):227–53, April 1978.
22